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Ang Ming Chee*
the Chinese Education Movement in Malaysia1 
Abstract
This article explores why and how a minority social movement persists despite 
persistent constraints placed upon it by a majority-dominated State. The Chi-
nese education movement has been one of the largest, longest, and most sus-
tained social movements in Malaysia. Sociological, economic, and demographic 
changes of the Chinese community along with domestic political struggles 
revolving around the ethnic question have influenced the fluctuation of movement 
trajectory over time. The movement has sustained its activities and received 
moral and material support from the Chinese communities, despite persistent 
constraints by the government, scarcity of resources and lack of support from 
others Malaysian population. This article argues that constraints imposed by 
the State have been utilized by the social movement organization to mobilize 
support from the masses, and thus became the most significant factors that 
have sustained the movement. The article will first look into the evolution of the 
social movement and analyze the dynamic interaction between the State and 
the challengers from various perspectives, including the current status update of 
the social movement organizations and activities organized to sustain continuous 
collective action. In addition to the analysis of the movement’s achievements, 
this article will also explain the State’s reaction towards the movement and the 
measures undertaken to constrain or terminate the movement. 
Keywords:
Social movement, Malaysia, Chinese, Education
* Ming Chee is currently a doctoral candidate at the Department of Political Science, National 
University of Singapore. E-mail: angmingchee@gmail.com
1 This paper has been written according to a preliminary framework of the author’s upcoming 
doctoral thesis, which will be completed by winter 2010. 
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Introduction 
Arguably, Malaysia’s longest-running social movement organization, Dongjiao-
zong, is a rare example in Asia, as an ethnically-based social movement organi-
zation actively engaged in contentious politics for more than five decades. The 
Chinese educational movement in Malaysia was originally started by a group of 
Chinese school teachers who precipitated a sense of crisis in Chinese society 
after the release of the Barnes Report in June 1951.2 The early stage of the 
movement saw the collaboration of three significant Chinese associations in 
Malaya, including the United Chinese School Teachers’ Association (Jiaozong), 
the United Chinese School Committees’ Association (Dongzong), and the Ma-
laysian Chinese Associations defending the status of Chinese education during 
Malaya’s transition from a colonial to a new independent state.3 
After the Malaysian Chinese Associations were fully co-opted4 into the 
National Front alliance (Barisan Nasional)5 in 1961, Jiaozong and Dongzong 
jointly formed Dongjiaozong as the formal organization of the Chinese language 
education movement. Dongjiaozong was known as “the most crucial institution 
that sustains and coordinates the financial incomes, (which) unified the move-
ment activities, and is the platform in planning strategies for the movement” 
(Lee, 1957; Chen, 1992; Tan, 1997: 291; Kua, 1999). 
Dongjiaozong is linked and supported by hundreds of Chinese-based 
community organizations, as well as individual members, through official and 
unofficial channels. The movement, its organizations, and supporters have faced 
many challenges and constraints from the ethnically Malay-dominated state. 
From the inter-communal tensions and anti-communist agenda in the 1960s, 
the impact of the New Economic Policy since 1971, the influence of the world 
Islamization movement and the rise of Mahathir Mohammad during the 1980s, 
globalized industrialization and capitalization of domestic economy in the 1990s, 
and the post-Mahathir era in the 2000s, the existence and sustainability of the 
Chinese education movement in Malaysia have been consistently challenged. 
These challenges, on certain occasions, became opportunities and sources of 
motivation for the constant struggles of the movement. 
Dongjiaozong is often disparaged as chauvinistic or extremist by State of-
ficials, and many restrictive regulations and suppressive policies have been imple-
2 The Barnes Report, also known as Report of the Committee on Malay Education: Federation of 
Malaya recommended that all vernacular schools should be abolished and replaced by a single 
system of primary school teaching in English and Malaya. It triggered a strong reaction in the Chi-
nese community and brought together all 1,400 associations to discuss this government legislation. 
The discussion ended with the formation of the United Chinese Schools Teachers’ Association 
and the United Chinese Schools Committees Association (Palanca, 2004).
3 Malaysia was formed officially on September 16, 1963 merging four former British colonies, includ-
ing federation of Malaya (independent since August 31, 1957), Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore. 
Singapore left the federation and formed an independent republic State in 1965 due to disparity 
on state building principles with the National Alliance Front government. 
4 After the death of Malaysian Chinese Association charismatic leader Tan Cheng Lock in 1958, the 
Malaysian Chinese Association has been divided into two fractions―the pro-United Chinese School 
Teachers’ Association leaders (lead by Lim Chong Eu), and those who prefer closer cooperation 
with the Alliance and United Malays National Organisation (lead by Tan Siew Sin, son of Tan Cheng 
Lock). In 1959, Lim Chong Eu and his supporters resigned from the party positions and formed 
a new political party, Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia. The Malaysian Chinese Association party 
commission was then replaced with Tan Siew Sin’s close aids. 
5 As of March 2007, there are 14 component parties within the Barisan Nasional. This includes The 
United Malays National Organisation, The Malaysian Chinese Association, The Malaysian Indian 
Congress, Parti Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu, Sarawak United People’s Party, Parti Gerakan Rakyat 
Malaysia, People’s Progressive Party, Liberal Democratic Party, Sabah Progressive Party, Parti 
Bersatu Rakyat Sabah, United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organisation, Parti Bersatu 
Sabah, Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party, and Parti Rakyat Sarawak.
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mented as a means to extirpate the movement. Yet, the movement lives on. It has 
skillfully seized opportunities, generated and accumulated resources, and handled 
its dealing with the State and its social and political opponents with aplomb. In so 
doing, it has garnered a solid reputation and great respect among the Chinese 
community as a defender of Chinese culture and rights in Malaysia. 
This study will examine the following questions: Why and how does a minority 
social movement persist despite ongoing constraints by a majority-dominated State? 
Can this be explained by the strength of the social movement relative to the moder-
ateness of the State? This article argues that the social movement has generated an 
interdependent relationship between the State and its challengers, which enables the 
social movement to survive State repression. Both the State and the social move-
ment’s activities have been each other’s tool to generate support in strengthening 
their political influence respectively. Thus, room for tolerance within the Malaysian 
illiberal democratic context, though it has changed little over time, prevented extreme 
measures from being taken by both actors. The movement has yet to achieve its 
objectives due to the exclusiveness of its framing process and is therefore unable 
to garner stronger support from the greater Malaysian community. 
Malaya Chinese and Nation Building
Chinese from mainland China started migrating in large numbers to Southeast 
Asia, better known as Nanyang, in the mid-eighteenth century. The weakening 
power of the Qing Dynasty, the spread of mass rebellions, the invasion of foreign 
powers, and widespread prolonged starvation pushed many Chinese, especially 
from the Southern region, to answer the call of labor demands from mines, es-
tates, and harbors in Nanyang. Over time, a significant portion of them ended 
in the British settlements as businessmen or traders, thus forming a nascent 
urban middle class. Many of these overseas Chinese retained strong ties with 
China and held on to their identity through culture and daily life. 
With continuing large-scale migration, including the arrival of Chinese 
women beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, and increasing marriages of the more 
successful Chinese business entrepreneurs with local women, the numbers 
of (second generation) Chinese increased. Sehtuan or community organiza-
tions6 based on clan, regional and occupational links, established more Chi-
nese schools7 to serve the needs of their children. These schools became “an 
important site of political socialization of the younger generation” (Tan, 1997). 
The participation of Chinese businessmen as sponsors of these schools also 
enhanced the social and political status of these individuals in the community. 
Despite the dialects, customs, traditions and political distinction, the Chinese 
shared common Confucian influences and acknowledged education as an 
important factor that would secure better living conditions for their children. 
Whether locally born or newly immigrated, these Chinese, were “all equally 
excluded from the British policy during the colonial periods” (Emerson, 1964: 
479). As a result, Chinese vernacular education was financed and managed 
exclusively and independently by the community, and coexisted with other 
6 Sehtuan, or community organizations, have been a mode of civil education and an effective 
channel in passing on the cultural heritage in China since the Sung Dynasty. In 1949, there were 
over 1,500 Sehtuan in colonial Malaya. The most important were Chinese chambers of commerce 
of each state and the Chinese assembly halls. Dominated by wealthy businessmen who were ex-
pected to be benefactors to their communities, the Sehtuan network represented the real power 
structure of the Chinese community (Tan, 1997).
7 Historically, Chinese education developed in Malaysia over 180 years, since the establishment 
of Wufu School in Penang, in 1819. In 1904, a new type of Chinese school, offering a curriculum 
of history, geography, mathematics, science and the teaching of vernacular Chinese (Baihuawen) 
over classical Chinese (Wenyanwen) was introduced. 
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schools of different language streams, i.e. English, Malay, or Tamil, which fulfilled 
the needs of different communal groups. 
These divisions within the educational system were the strategic outcome 
of the British-inspired divide-and-rule policy; therefore, the Chinese community 
relied heavily on its own means to establish and sustain the function and financial 
needs of these schools. Wealthy businessmen, who were also members of the 
State’s Chinese chambers of commerce and assembly halls, were the main ben-
efactors to their community’s development by donating space (shop houses or 
clan houses) and land for schools. They also provided the financial support to hire 
teachers (mostly from mainland China) and to sustain the expenses of the school. 
These benefactors became the schools’ management committee members and 
were responsible for making most of the decisions for the schools from the school 
curriculum to the employment of teachers and their salary schemes.
During the 1930s and 1940s, the growth of Chinese nationalism, the 
appearance of the Chinese Republic, and the rise to dominance of 
the Kuomintang had brought about a transformation of the politi-
cal consciousness of the Chinese overseas which tended to alter 
radically their relations to the government under which they live 
(Emerson, 1964: 505).
Many Malayan Chinese groups, either first generation migrants or the children 
of these pioneers, started to settle down in Nanyang with their families. They 
established businesses and a political network with the British colonial admin-
istration and started to mix in with the multi-cultural society. Malayan Chinese 
nationalist awareness blossomed in the 1940s, when Malaya was moving toward 
independence. 
After the British re-took control of Malaya in August 1945 after World 
War II, they introduced the Malayan Union government on April 1, 1946 as a 
unified and more cost-effective government structure. It was also conceived 
as preparation for the possibility of self-rule and independence. The scheme 
offered full citizenship rights to Chinese and Indians born in Malaya, and dis-
solved the sultanates into one secular union.8 Its imposition shocked the Malay 
community and promoted the emergence of the first Malay nationalist party, 
United Malays National Organisation, which was founded on May 11, 1946 to 
oppose the British-imposed Malayan Union, protect the political interests of 
the Malays, and demand the return of Malaya to the status quo.9 Due to strong 
protest and pressure from Malay aristocrats and former Malayan governors in 
London, the Malayan Union was dismantled and replaced by the Federation of 
Malaya on February 1, 1948 (Chai, 1977: 7).
The Federation of Malaya reinstated the traditional prerogatives of sultans, 
and restored “special rights” to Malays as bumiputras.10 It also tightened the 
qualification for federal citizenship by disqualifying over three quarters of the 
8 The British ruled Malaya through the “direct and indirect” government. The Straits Settlements 
of Penang, Malacca, and Singapore were the entrepot trade centers. These settlements had 
non-Malay majorities, and were ruled directly as crown colonies. The Malay states with signifi-
cant commercial activities (i.e. tin mines and rubber plantations)―which included Perak, Selangor, 
Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang―were set up as Federated Malaya States. Those states lacking 
such activities―which included Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, and Johore―were ruled as Un-
federated Malaya States (von Vorys, 1975: 22, 142).
9 During an earlier meeting on March 1, 1946, 38 Malay parties gathered at the Sultan Sulaiman 
Club Kuala Lumpur to oppose the Malayan Union government and form a united Malay opposi-
tion. The Third Malay Congress, held in Istana Besar, Johore Bahru officially formed the United 
Malays National Organisation, Onn bin Jaafar was selected as the first president. See Abdul 
Rahman Putra, 1986: 1.
10 Bumiputra, or sons of the soil, refers to those who habitually spoke Malaya, professed Islam, 
and conformed to traditional Malay customs (adat). 
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Chinese population.11 Thus, disparate ethnic Chinese, although initially divided 
by their clans, dialects, social hierarchies, political views, and economic identi-
ties, were driven to unite themselves over disqualification from citizenship after 
the painful experience of massacre during the Japanese occupation.12
Chin Peng became the Malayan Communist Party’s13 secretary-general 
in 1947 after the former leader, Lai Tek,14 absconded with the Party’s funds in 
March 1947 (Ramakrishna, 2002: 32). In a bid to empower the weakening party,15 
Chin emulated the successful model of Mao’s revolutionary movement in China, 
and launched an armed guerilla rebellion under the Malayan Races Liberation 
Army. This took place after the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions was 
outlawed in June 1948 because it sought independence from the British. The 
Malayan Races Liberation Army-led rebellion eventually prompted the British to 
declare a State of Emergency on June 16, 1948. The Emergency also gave the 
British and their Malay successors justification to mobilize a significant amount 
of resources in their war against communism.16 
As members of the Malayan Communist Party were largely ethnic Chi-
nese, and many Chinese schools were used as centers of Chinese Communist 
Party propaganda, the British misunderstood the Chinese in Malaya, who were 
generally stereotyped as communist supporters, or as fence-sitters in the anti-
communist campaign (Chew, 1975; Heng, 1988: 251; Freedman, 2000: 55). 
For example, the British believed the many Chinese squatters who hid in the 
jungles during World War II had provided supplies to the Malayan Communist 
Party or had been recruited as new party members (Chai, 1977: 10; Lee, 1998: 
11 According to Chai (1977: 8), there were only 350 thousand (11.2 percent) Chinese, and 225 
thousand (7.2 percent) Indians were eligible as citizens of Federation of Malaya under the “opera-
tion of law” condition on February 1, 1948. For a non-Malay to qualify for citizenship, he must 
have been born in any of the Malay states, Penang or Malacca and prove that both his parents 
had been born in any of the territories and had resided there continuously for at least 15 years. 
To be eligible for citizenship by application, a person, if born in the country, had to prove that he 
had lived there for at least 10 out of 15 years preceding the date of his application. If not born 
there, he had to prove that he had resided there for at least 15 out of the 20 years immediately 
preceding the date of this application. In addition, he was to be of good character, must have an 
adequate knowledge of Malay or English, and had made a declaration of permanent settlement 
and would be willing to take and oath of allegiance to the federation, if his application were ap-
proved. Ratnam (1965: 78). 
12 According to Hirofumi (2008), the Japanese military began the Kakyo Shukusei operation 
(better known to the Chinese population in Malaya and Singapore as Sook Ching-purge through 
purification). The wartime massacres on ethnic Chinese happened during the early phase of the 
Japanese invasion and occupation of Malaya and Singapore (December 1941–April 1942) and 
continued in other forms until August 1945 (Peattie, 1996: 230-231). It was estimated that the 
numbers of victims had been as high as 50 thousand in Singapore and 40 thousand in Malaya 
(Cheah, 1987: 23).
13 The Malayan Communist Party, formed in 1930, comprised Chinese migrant laborers mainly. 
By 1955, the rebellion was virtually crushed, although remnants of the party continued the struggle 
along the Thai-Malaya border. They continued the military resistance against the federal government 
of Malaya until the 1989 peace treaty. See Ramakrishna (2002) for Malayan Communist Party’s 
struggles in Malaya during the Emergency. 
14 Lai Tek, was the Malayan Communist Party secretary general since 1938. He was a secret 
agent for the Japanese as well as the British; however, the double agent identity was revealed 
in 1947. For more details of Lai Tek and the elite conflicts of Malayan Communist Party, see Fujio 
(1995: 37-58).
15 Chin Peng became the Malayan Communist Party secretary-general in 1947 after Lai Tek 
(Malayan Communist Party Secretary General, 1938-1947) absconded with Party funds in March 
1947. Ramakrishna (2002: 32).
16 The lengthy guerilla war (1948-1960) cost the British (and Malayan) government $850 million. 
The death toll rose to 11,048 (6,710 guerillas, 1,865 members of security forces, and 2,473 civil-
ians). See O’Balance (1966: 177); Stockwell (1999: 486); Pye (1957: 15).
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31-32). One of the largest and most successful strategies imposed by General 
Gerald Templer,17 the new High commissioner in 1952, was the Briggs Plan. It 
forcibly resettled almost 570 thousand Chinese squatters into hundreds of new 
villages, which in the end helped to control and contain the communist rebellion 
(Sandhu, 1964; Lim and Soong, 2000).
According to Ramakrishna (2001: 82), “the rural Chinese were the target 
of government’s Emergency measures: in particular individual detention and 
deportation, communal fines and curfews”. In total, thirty thousand Commu-
nist activists were jailed, and another fifteen thousand were deported to China 
(Lomperis, 1996: 204). Many of them were Chinese school principals, teachers, 
and students (Choong, 2004: 184).
With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China on October 
1, 1949, most overseas Chinese communities feared that the new Communist 
State might confiscate their properties and businesses, and were therefore 
reluctant to express their loyalty to the new Chinese government. This included 
the Chinese in Malaya who began to consider Malaya as their only hope for a 
permanent homeland (Heng, 1988: 251). 
In an attempt to alleviate the Chinese community’s dilemma, Tan Cheng 
Lock,18 with support from various Chinese organizations and guilds, formed the 
Malayan Chinese Association on February 27, 1949. Initially, the Malayan Chinese 
Association sought to provide relief and welfare assistance to the displaced 
Chinese villagers, to redirect Chinese support away from the communists and 
to provide an image of loyalty of the Chinese in the midst of suspicions aroused 
by the Emergency against the Chinese community in general.19 
By August 1951, Tunku Abdul Rahman became the party president of 
United Malays National Organisation and established a multi-ethnic political 
Alliance, first, in 1952, with the Malayan Chinese Association,20 and then in 
1954, with the Malaysian Indian Congress.21 This marked the beginning of 
Malaya’s national politics, characterized by rationally-compromising tactics 
that have resulted over time in unintended consequences. Tunku Abdul Rah-
man and Tan Cheng Lock were among the pioneers in Malayan history that 
17 General Templer arrived in Malaya in February 1952, to replace Sir Henry Gurney who had 
died in a terrorist ambush in late 1951. Templer was both High Commissioner and Military Director 
of Operations, and had full authority to wage counter communist insurgency operations, using 
policing, intelligence and psychological warfare. See Ramakrishna (2001); Abdul Rahman Putra 
(1986: 35).
18 Tan Cheng Lock, the Malayan Chinese Association first president, was straits-born, English-
educated, and came from a Baba-Chinese family. He served as nominated member at the Ma-
lacca Municipal Council and Straits Settlements Legislative Council, and was known to the British 
highest officials, such as Malcolm MacDonald and Henry Gurney. See Tan (1988: 50-51); Heng 
(1988: 67, 251).
19 The Malayan Chinese Association started out as a welfare organization, selling lottery tickets 
to raise funds to help needy Chinese, especially those forced to resettle in the 600 new villages. 
The Malayan Chinese Association also sponsored schooling in new villages by providing basic 
education to adults. It was only four years later, in 1952, that the Malayan Chinese Association took 
its first step towards its political destiny. News Straits Times, March 1, 2009, “Malayan Chinese 
Association Diamond Jubilee: Another struggle, 60 years on.” See Tan (1988: 50); Stubbs (1989); 
Freedman (2000: 56).
20 The formation of the alliance of United Malays National Organisation and Malayan Chinese 
Association was a result of the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Election in 1952. The new Alliance of the 
United Malays National Organisation and the Malayan Chinese Association won landslide victories 
across the Federation of Malaya. See Abdul Rahman Putra (1986: 35).
21 The Malaysian Indian Congress was established in August 1946 to support Indian independ-
ence from British rule. After India gained its independence, it started to support the independence 
of Malaya. See Lomperis (1996: 207).
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promoted communal cooperation to succeed in the election and formed a 
new Malayan government. 
The transition from a colonial to an independent state went beyond State 
capacity or the State’s political system. Many other issues which the British had 
paid little attention to needed to be confronted, and possibly solved. The future 
of educational policy was illustrative, as the formation of independent Malaya was 
dominated by the Malay elites who wanted the Malay language as the dominant 
official language for post-independent Malaya. On the other hand, minorities, 
especially the Chinese and Indians preferred, a multi-lingual, multi-communal, 
and multi-cultural new state. The vernacular school has since then become the 
topic of debates, as a symbol of the  rights of these minorities. 
Thus, many Chinese school teachers in the newly post-independent Malaya 
were closely engaged with the civil war in China. School teachers were divided 
according to their political ideology―either those who supported the nationalist 
republican revolution of Sun Yet San and his Kuomingtang party, or those who 
supported the Communist party of China. Following the victory of the latter in 
1949, British officers, along with their Malay bureaucratic approach, justified 
regulation and control over Chinese schools as an anti-Communist measure. 
The 1951 Barnes Report proposed the abolition of separate vernacular 
schools. The 1952 New Salary Aid Scheme took over the administrative control 
of Chinese school teachers’ employment and qualification requirements. The 
1961 Education Act conferred upon the Minister of Education the arbitrary power 
to convert primary Chinese schools into national primary schools (National 
Education Act, 1961, Section 21 (2)), and also included other educational ordi-
nances that proposed significant discrimination and marginalization of Chinese 
vernacular education in Malaysia. 
Article 8 (1) of the Malaysian Constitution, which clearly spells out the 
principle of equality of all Malaysians, and Article 12 (1) forbids discrimination 
against any citizen on the grounds of religion, race, descent, or place of birth. 
Nevertheless, the educational policies meant unjustified treatment to the Chinese 
community in the new nation-State. Thus, it was crucial for early independent 
politics and struggles over the definition of citizenship from which this particular 
social movement organization was born. It was then carried on by the teachers’ 
association and school committees. 
Jiaozong was formed in December 1951 when the teachers realized 
the urgency of forming a national organization after the Fenn-Wu 
Committee met them during the Committee’s survey of Chinese 
schools in the peninsula between February and April 1951. As a re-
sult of discussions with the Fenn-Wu Committee, the teachers were 
alerted to the implications of the Barnes Committees’ recommenda-
tions even before the report was published. According to its Inaugural 
Manifesto, the three main objectives of the teachers association is to 
promote Chinese culture and defend Chinese education, to improve 
Chinese education through co-operation with the government, and 
to safeguard the interests and improve the working conditions of the 
Chinese school teachers22 (Tan, 1997: 91-92).
After the creation of Jiaozong, school management committees also felt threat-
ened by several new educational policies, and therefore decided to establish 
the umbrella organization Dongzong to coordinate the responses to the gov-
ernment proposal at the State level. Community leaders who sat on the Man-
agement Committees of Chinese schools were the second major component 
22 The Inaugural Manifesto of the United Chinese School Teachers Association, reprinted in 
Jiaozong 33 nian, pp.12–13. Quoted in Tan (1997).
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of the movement to defend Chinese schools. Later, these two organizations 
formed jointly the Dongjiaozong as the unified and formal movement organiza-
tion (Dongzong, 2003).
Dongjiaozong Organization Structure Diagram23
The debate over the “vernacular school as an obstacle to nation-building in a 
multi-ethnic society or as the harbinger of a transformed political identity” (Tan, 
1997) has triggered an ongoing struggle between the Chinese education move-
ment with the Malay dominated government, as well as within the Chinese com-
munity. Dongjiaozong generally receives support from the majority of the Chinese 
community in Malaysia. The movement struggles to resist the encroachment 
of the State in the curriculum and medium of instruction of vernacular schools, 
presses for public financial support of Chinese schools (Chinese primary schools, 
independent Chinese secondary schools, and tertiary academic institutions), 
and advocates legitimate official recognition of these schools within the national 
education system. In this process, the cause of Chinese education has become 
a key factor in Chinese political mobilization. This movement has resisted Malay 
cultural domination and has become a crucial motif within an evolving political 
vision to carry out Chinese integration into Malaysian society while retaining their 
cultural identity (Weiss, 2006: 63-64).
The British did not succeed in closing down, or ending out, the 
Chinese school for two reasons. First, with the Emergency at its 
height, the colonial government was reluctant to take harsh meas-
ures against the Chinese schools, as this would have alienated more 
Chinese. Second, and no less important, the British were simply 
not able to provide alternatives to the Chinese schools which were 
meeting a critical need for more education created by the post-war 
baby boom (Tan, 1997: 283). 
The State dilemma paved the way for the incorporation of Chinese schools 
within the national system. Today, the Malaysian national education system 
consists of two categories of primary schools: the National School and the 
National-Type School. The medium of instruction in the former is the Malay 
language with English as a compulsory subject, while the medium of instruc-
tion and examination in the latter is either Chinese or Tamil, with Malay and 
23 The author translated and re-developed the diagram from its original version in Mandarin 
posted by the United Chinese School Committees Association of Malaysia. Website at http://
www.djz.edu.my/home.htm
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English as compulsory subjects. At the secondary school level, fifty four out 
of seventy Chinese secondary schools nationwide accepted government’s 
terms of conversion into the national system after the implementation of 1961 
Education Act; the remaining 16 Chinese independent schools continued their 
autonomous existence as Mandarin medium secondary schools. Despite the 
variety of instructional language mediums, all schools in Malaysia, including 
both types of public national schools as well as the private schools, follow the 
integrated curriculum established by the Ministry of Education. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese educational movement was 
unable to achieve its objective of maintaining the original characteristics of the 
Chinese school, nor was it possible to retain the movement’s original fellowship 
with Malaysian Chinese Association, when it was fully co-opted within the Na-
tional Front after the death of Tan Cheng Lock (the first president of the Malaysian 
Chinese Association). After Tan Siew Sin and his allies took over the Malaysian 
Chinese Association, the pro-National Front Chinese leaders preferred closer 
cooperation with the United Malays National Organisation and proposed an 
adapted agenda for Chinese education in Malaysia. Having lost the support from 
the Malaysian Chinese Association, the advocates of the Chinese educational 
movement had fully manipulated the “sense of danger of being demolished” 
and the change in “the fundamental characteristic of Chinese primary school” 
(Chin UH, 2000) to mobilize support from Chinese communities in defend-
ing and developing Chinese education. There is a strong belief among ethnic 
Chinese in Malaysia that for Chinese culture to survive and flourish, Chinese 
schools are essential. An extensive network of vernacular schools throughout 
the country was therefore established slowly as from the 1960s, with strong 
a commitment from the Chinese community throughout Malaysia under the 
patronage of Dongjiaozong. 
Our culture is the soul of our ethnicity; our educational mechanism 
is the castle of our ethnicity’s culture. 
Lim Lian Geok, Jiaozong Chairman (1953-1961)
In its early phase, the movement successfully voiced shared grievances and 
established collaborative networks among school teachers and management 
committees. Nevertheless, it was limited to the elites and the educated class. It 
had yet to receive popular support, especially from the middle and lower classes, 
due to the limitation of post-World War II Malaya, where securing livelihoods and 
rebuilding homes and lives was a more important agenda for most. Neverthe-
less, the inter-communal grievances continued to exist and were tense until the 
breakout of the May 1969 riots24 after the Malay-dominated ruling Alliance failed 
to secure a two-third parliamentary majority (Singh, 2001: 49-50). 
Following the 1969 riots, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the then Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, declared a state of national emergency,25 which lasted until 1971. The 
regime also introduced affirmative action to “eradicate poverty irrespective of 
24 The national ethnicity riots on 13 May 1969 were a dark spot of Malaysian stability. The riots 
broke out in Kuala Lumpur a day after the 1969 Federal elections due to simmering racial tension 
between Malays and Chinese and took the lives of hundreds of people. Order was restored after 
four days but for two months incidents of communal violence persisted.
 
The exact casualty list 
of this riot has never been told to the public until today. The government deems that it is a threat 
to national security and disallows discussion on this topic. The exact number of casualties in this 
riot varies, depending on whether it is a government figure or provided by independent academic 
research. Hwang (2003) indicated that, according to the police, 196 people had died and 149 
had been wounded.
25 In Malaysia, when a state of emergency is declared, the Emergency Ordinance is enacted and 
Parliament, as well as the Constitution, are suspended by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (Head of 
State of Malaysia), under article 150 of Malaysian Constitution. 
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race” and to “restructure society to correct the economic imbalances of wealth 
holding to which led to the identification of race with economic function”. In 1971, 
the government launched the New Economic Policy to reform the economic 
institution and reduce poverty substantially, thus leading to the growth of ethnic 
Malay middle and business classes. Increasing “influence of political patronage 
on the business sector, and the increasingly inequitable distribution of wealth, 
and the apparent increase in corruption and other abuses of power” (Gomez 
and Jomo, 1999: 1) led to deeper misunderstanding and increased Chinese 
mistrust toward the Malay-dominated State. Thus, educational issues have often 
been manipulated as a political concern, both by political parties and by the 
movement’s actors. The high-profile attention given to Chinese education issues 
has helped to minimize the collective action problem and free-riding mentality 
caused by the continuous construction of injustice framed within Chinese society. 
Consequently, it also has helped to sustain social movements indirectly. 
Institutional reform and revive Movements 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese education movement saw a more prominent 
role played by the school committees as most Chinese school teachers (who 
were members of the teachers’ association) were given the status of govern-
ment employees by the Ministry of Education. With this change, they enjoyed 
a more secure salary scheme and better welfare coverage as civil servants; 
their involvement in the movement was also restricted as members of the civil 
service system under the Ministry of Education. On the other hand, younger and 
newer leaders emerged within Dongjiaozong working committee and provided 
changes of strategies to approach Chinese education issues. 
These leaders shifted the movement’s momentum toward giving support 
for Chinese educational institutions outside the national system, such as the 
Independent Chinese secondary school and the proposed Merdeka (Inde-
pendent) University; thus making the movement more inclusive, broad-based 
and better known outside Chinese- educated circles. One of its attempts was 
to start a campaign to save Chinese private secondary schools from minimal 
enrollment, lack of funding and insufficient facilities. 
In 1973, Dongjiaozong established a Working Committee, which was 
tasked with drafting a more competitive curriculum for the 60 Chinese independ-
ent schools. The Committee also had to design, prepare and print standard 
textbooks, and outline comprehensive and high-standard examinations tailored 
to the schools’ special needs. The schools’ high academic standards have now 
been well received by the Chinese, and some Malay and Indian communities in 
Malaysia, and the recognition secured sizeable numbers of students each year.26 
Yet, the Ministry of Education and the Public Service Department of Malaysia 
have yet to validate the examinations, certificates, and graduates from these 
independent secondary schools. 
In the late 1970s, Dongjiaozong led a campaign to establish the privately-
funded, Merdeka University “to serve as a non-profit making body to meet the 
demands of those students who have no opportunity to pursue higher educa-
tion in local universities and to help the government shoulder the responsibility 
in education”.27 The campaign generated overwhelming support from a wide 
26 The outstanding academic achievement of Chinese graduate students has also been ac-
knowledged by Chinese descendant communities in other Southeast Asia countries, especially 
in Thailand and Indonesia. 
27 Summarized from the English version of Merdeka University: Kenyataan-keyataan dan kritikan-
kritikan University Merdeka Bhd. 1978, quoted in Aliran (1979) The Real Issues: Aliran on the Merdeka 
University (Pulau Pinang, Malaysia: Aliran Publications), p.5.
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spectrum of the Chinese community, mainly because the Chinese in particular 
felt marginalized by the New Economic Policy launched since 1971. Hawkers, 
market sellers, trishaw peddlers, workers, as well as businessmen, all donated 
to the cause in order “to find alternative channels for education, through self 
reliance and community based institution, when the public sector could not 
meet their expectation” (Tan, 1997: 288-291).
The application for establishing the university was rejected outright. The 
reasons proffered by the Minister of Education included that the use of the Chi-
nese language as the medium of instruction, and the meant to cater students 
from independent secondary schools only, would be contrary to the national 
policy.28 Subsequently, Merdeka University Berhad, a company formed to man-
age the affairs of Merdeka University, filed a suit against the government in Sep-
tember 1981. The court case “raised the question of the Chinese community’s 
rights to establish a private university” (Verma, 2002: 74). Even so, the lawsuit 
was ultimately rejected by the courts. Frustration in the Chinese community 
over this rejection was worsened by the fact that the very same State approved 
the establishment of the English-medium, International Islamic University in the 
early 1980s (Lee, 2000: 9).
During the 1980s, the movement went beyond the issues of language, 
education and culture and established closer cooperation with both “contained 
contention” and “transgressive contention” actors.29 In 1982, Dongjiaozong 
openly campaigned to support two Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia candidates 
in the national election; this effort was short-lived after it was criticized by the 
Democratic Action Party as supporting the National Front. 
Also, the Malaysian government made efforts to de-certify the movement 
rationale by publicly chiding Chinese schools and considering them obstacles 
to the assimilation of Chinese children into Malaysian society. The movement’s 
activists claimed that the current national education system had at best a superfi-
cial effect in uniting students of all races by promoting the integration of students 
from diverse races. The United Malays National Organisation-led National Front 
government tried to ensure that National Schools were the popular choice of all 
Malaysians by suppressing equal development opportunities, and limiting fund 
distribution to Chinese and Indian mother tongue education. 
Over the years, the Malaysian Chinese Association policy towards Chi-
nese education and its relationship with Dongjiaozong altered accordingly vis-
à-vis its relationship with United Malays National Organisation. As the biggest 
Chinese-based political party in the National Front, the Malaysian Chinese As-
sociation has both the duty and the burden of addressing Chinese education 
development in Malaysia. With the increased domination of the United Malays 
National Organisation in the alliance relationship, other member parties (includ-
ing the Malaysian Chinese Association) have been less successful in getting 
their demands. This has created a cooperative yet competitive relationship with 
Dongjiaozong. Critiques and demands from Dongjiaozong have hit the Malaysian 
28 See Abdoolcader J., as quoted in Visu Sinnadurai (1986) “Rights in Respect of Education un-
der the Malaysian Constitution” in Trindade and Lee (eds.) The Constitution of Malaysia: Further 
Perspectives and Developments (Singapore: Oxford University Press), p.52. 
29 The concept of “contained contention” includes events taking place in the form of formal 
structure by established political actors while “transgressive contention” has more volatile and 
unpredictable features in that it is initiated by newly self-identified political actors employing in-
novative collective action, which is unprecedented and forbidden within the regime in question. 
For more explanation on these two concepts, see McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) Dynamics of 
Contention (New York: Cambridge University Press).
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Chinese Association hard because the movement’s supporters have constituted 
an important block of votes for the party. 
One example was the Tunku Abdul Rahman College, first established in 
1969,30 which rapidly expanded since 1971. This college has been under the 
direct patronage of the Malaysian Chinese Association, politically and financially. 
The Tunku Abdul Rahman College offers alternative tertiary level educational 
opportunities for many Chinese students who are unable to enter the national 
universities in Malaysia due to the implementation of a restrictive ethnic quota 
system of the New Economic Policy.
Thus, many Malaysian Chinese Association leaders and individuals, either 
at central or local branch levels, became patrons of most of the Chinese schools 
across different levels (especially at primary school level). “Malaysian Chinese 
Association members now sit on school boards and committees, which finance 
and manage these schools” (Ling, 1995: 56-57). The Malaysian Chinese As-
sociation has also been relatively successful in organizing fund-raising events to 
generate financial support for Chinese schools through its membership network-
ing and business links. All told, Malaysian Chinese Association leaders (both 
at the state and at national level) come from diverse educational backgrounds 
and have equally diverse political interests and approaches. These differences 
have resulted in a wide-range of reactions to and stances toward the Chinese 
educational movement.
For one thing, Chinese politicians in the Malaysian Chinese Association and 
Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia have multiple roles in relation to the movement. 
They range from acting as “broker” on behalf of the ruling government in mediat-
ing the requests from the movement entrepreneurs to functioning as lobbyists of 
the Chinese community in demanding sufficient support from the government 
to develop Chinese education. To some extent, this dynamic relationship has 
successfully sustained the operation of many Chinese schools, but the role of 
the Malaysian Chinese Association as part of the government has also limited 
its freedom to oppose any educational policy or demand fundamental changes. 
Funding distribution and support to the Chinese schools is illustrative, as it has 
been “routinized” as part of the country’s electoral cycles.
Due to favorable governmental policy for Malays, and Islam, Chinese ver-
nacular education in Malaysia continuously suffers significant discrimination in 
the political, social, cultural, and economic spheres (Chin, 2000). The Chinese 
have always been proud of their ability to self-sustain their schools, as well as 
promoting and protecting mother-tongue education by providing financial and 
spiritual support to the Chinese educational movement (Dongjiaozong, 2002). 
The Chinese community has to raise millions of ringgit each year to ensure 
the proper development of their primary schools, despite 20.4 percent of the 
annual National Budget is allocated for education (Malaysia Ministry of Education, 
2004). Concomitantly, Chinese primary schools have faced perpetual short-
ages of qualified teachers, and thus have to depend on temporary teachers. 
The predicament has persisted and worsened as the State continues to lack a 
long-term plan to expand or deal with the issue of training teachers for Chinese 
primary schools (Lee, 2000). 
Malaysia is a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-linguistic, and multi-religion 
country. As of 2000, out of its 21,890 thousand citizens, Malays accounted for 
53.4 percent, Chinese 26.0 percent, and Indians 7.7 percent. Meanwhile, the 
30 Tunku Abdul Rahman College was established on February 24, 1969 with Malaysian Chinese 
Association support. The college started in 1969 and offered classes at the School of Pre-University 
Studies. The School of Business Studies was established in 1971, and it was further expanded 
in 1972 to include the School of Technology, the School of Arts and Science and the Extra-Mural 
Studies Department. The School of Social Science and Humanities was established in 1999. For 
more details, please see http://www.tarc.edu.my/about/abt_history3.htm.
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Chinese population in Malaysia has increased from 3,682,100 (33.8 percent of 
total Malaysian population) in 1968 to 5,691,400 (26.0 percent of total Malaysian 
population) in 2000. This means a higher number of Chinese children at school 
age (seven to twelve years old for primary education) from 434,914 in 1968 to 
622,820 in 2000 (43 percent increase in 32 years). Due to the government’s 
“one language, one educational system” policy, this population growth contrasts 
with the declining number of Chinese primary schools from 1,332 in 1968 to 
1,288 in 2000 (Chan and Tey, 2000). Despite increase of Chinese population, 
the establishment of more Chinese National Type Primary Schools were not 
allowed by the Ministry of Education.  
table 1. total population of Malaysian Citizens by Ethnic Group (‘000)
Year
Malay and 
Other Bumi-
putera
Chinese Indian Others Total
1968
6,277.5 
(57.0%)
3,682.1 
(33.8%)
   982.4 
(9.0%)
Missing data 10,892.0
1991
11,087.4 
(60.6%)
5,141.2 
(28.1%)
1,445.4 
(7.9%)
622.0 (3.4%) 18,296.0
2000
14,250.4 
(65.1%)
5,691.4 
(26.0%)
1,685.5 
(7.7%)
262.7 (1.2%) 21,890.0
2001
14,675.5 
(65.1%)
5,842.4 
(25.9%)
1,724.3 
(7.7%)
282.1 (1.3%) 22,524.4
2002
15,009.3 
(65.3%)
5,920.2 
(25.8%)
1,751.9 
(7.6%)
289.5 (1.3%) 22,970.9
2003
15,351.2 
(65.5%)
5,997.0 
(25.6%)
1,779.3 
(7.6%)
296.9 (1.3%) 23,424.3
2004
15,701.4 
(65.7%)
6,074.6 
(25.4%)
1,806.8 
(7.6%)
304.3 (1.3%) 23,887.1
2005
16,060.5 
(65.9%)
6,154.9 
(25.3%)
1,834.8 
(7.5%)
311.8 (1.3%) 24,362.0
Sources: 
1. Department of Statistics (1969) “Table 1.1. Demography: Population as at 31 December 1968” in Annual Bulletin of Statistic Malaysia (Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia: Department of Statistic), p.1. 
2. Department of Statistic (2001) Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristics Report, Population and Housing Census 2000. 
November 6 (Putrajaya, Malaysia: Department of Statistic). 
3. Department of Statistic (2005) “Table 3.8 Mid-Year Population Estimates by Ethnic Group and Sex” in Year Book of Statistic (Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia: Department of Statistic), p.37.
The movement’s activists advocate that sending children to Chinese primary 
schools is one of the most practical ways to sustain the remaining schools 
today. Most of these schools were built in the pre-independence period with 
donations by the Chinese community, and were later absorbed into the national 
educational system following independence. Today, more than 90 percent of 
Chinese parents send their children to Chinese primary schools. Although most 
of these schools are over-crowded, the better academic environment and per-
formance, and the increasing economic value of the Chinese language have 
attracted a growing number of non-Chinese students. According to the Ministry 
of Education’s own statistics, there are 65 thousand non-Chinese children (or 
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10.7 percent of the total) studying in Chinese primary schools (Weiss, 2006; 
Dongjiaozong, 2007). 
Table 2. Number of Government Subsidized Primary Schools and Total of Students in 1968 and in 2000 
Types of 
Primary Schools
1968 2000 Increase/Decrease
Number of 
Schools
Number of 
Students
Number of 
Schools
Number of 
Students
Number of 
Schools
Number of 
Students
National 
School
2,770 666,389 5,407 2,218,747 + 2,637 + 1,552,358
National Type 
School (Chi-
nese)
1,332 434,914 1,288 622,820 - 44 + 187,906
National Type 
School (Tamil)
670 81,428 526 90,280 - 144 + 8852
TOTAL 4,459 1,182,731 7,221 7,326 +2,449 1,749,116
Notes:
1. There were 1,435 government-sponsored English-based primary schools in 1968. All of these schools have been transformed into National type 
school, using Malay as the main instruction medium from 1970 onwards. 
2. The statistics of National Type School include the special schools. 
Source: Ministry of Education and Unit of Survey Research and Information; Dongjiaozong Chinese Primary School Committee.
On October 27, 1987, Malaysian police carried out the infamous Operasi Lalang 
(Weeding Operation), by which they captured 106 persons under the draconian 
Internal Security Act. This operation was provoked after Anwar Ibrahim, the then 
Minister of Education, appointed one hundred non-Chinese educated senior 
assistants and principals to vernacular Chinese primary schools. 
The Chinese community reaction to this policy was furious. They saw it 
as another attempt by the government to change the Chinese primary 
school into a national school. On October 11, 1987, Dongjiaozong gath-
ered at the Hainanese Association Building in Kuala Lumpur where for 
the first time in the history of Malaysia, Chinese were united despite geo-
graphical location, social or economy class, as well as political stands. 
This gathering called for the government to resolve the appointments 
issue by the latest on October 14, 1987; if not they would call a three-
day nationwide boycott in Chinese schools (Sia KY, 2005: 128). 
This incident was mirrored by a large anti-Chinese protest of some ten thousand 
demonstrators was held. Malay politicians used the occasion to condemn the 
National Front Chinese-based political party for their collaboration with the opposi-
tion party, as well as Dongjiaozong. The official investigation from the government 
indicated that arrests were necessary to contain escalating racial tension. Although 
most of the detainees were released either conditionally or unconditionally, forty 
of them were issued two-year detention orders. Among the detainees were 
politicians, opposition leaders and social activists (Sia, 2005; Dongzong, 2003). 
During the 1970s and until the 1980s, the movement started to gain sus-
tainability; most of its efforts concentrated on providing assistance to existing 
Chinese primary schools and the Independent Secondary School. Once again, 
the State resurrected the ghost of the past to instill fear in Malaysians, inasmuch 
as to suppress society in the name of national harmony and stability in the 
multiethnic society. In doing so, it implemented more authoritarian controls over 
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opposing challengers to the status quo. The challengers also learned their own 
lessons―to “find creative ways to avoid suppression and convince the public that 
an omnipresent government is fallible but also to strike an optimal balance among 
strategies of protest, both inside and outside the system” (Weiss, 2006: 241). 
This social movement began as a communal struggle between the Chinese 
minorities within a majority Malay-dominated State. Since the 1970s, the move-
ment has broadened its advocacy, which today includes the fight for rights, by 
promoting a society of tolerance and respect for diversity rather than narrow-
minded chauvinism. Such appeals take advantage of common frames uniting 
opposing actors, while making reformist demands appear morally irrefutable and 
universally relevant (Weiss, 2006: 49). Nevertheless, the Malaysian government 
has used various legal mechanisms to suppress and decertify the movement. 
political opportunities and New politics in Malaysia 
Despite the failed attempts to establish an independent university, Dongjiao-
zong managed to set up the New Era College in 1997, at a time when private 
colleges and institutions were blooming in Malaysia under the new and more 
liberal tertiary educational policy. This community-funded tertiary institution can 
be seen as a tertiary-level extension of the Malaysian Chinese school system. 
The existence of the movement organization, plus the operation of the Chinese 
primary schools, Independent Secondary Schools, and the New Era College 
are landmarks of success of the movement today. 
Here, it is observed that, interestingly, Dongjiaozong adapted the lessons 
learnt from the Merdeka University struggle. The New Era College was designed 
with emphasis on providing multi-cultural, holistic, and socially responsible 
education. The college welcomes both Chinese-educated and non-Chinese 
educated students to enroll in the college; this liberal policy was quite different 
from that of Merdeka University that only targeted single-community students. 
The college emphasized upholding academic freedom and student autonomy, 
something which had been seriously lacking in most of the tertiary educational 
institutions in Malaysia.31 
During the 1999 general election, the National Front government faced 
waves of challenges from the United Malays National Organisation-Anwar faction, 
including accusations of cronyism and corruption under Mahathir’s administra-
tion. Anwar was removed from all his political positions, including that of deputy 
Prime Minister and was jailed under the charges of corruption and sodomy. 
The departure of Anwar and his allies from United Malays National Organisa-
tion weakened the United Malays National Organisation political domination in 
many electoral constituencies, and the party was seriously challenged by the 
opposition Islamic Party of Malaysia, as well as the People’s Justice Party. By 
use of gerrymandering, the role of Chinese (and other minority) votes became 
overwhelmingly significant especially in the Malay majority constituencies, where 
supporters were divided by the two factions. 
This created political opportunities for Dongjiaozong, and with support 
from more than 2,000 Malaysian Chinese organizations, this political opportu-
nity was utilized to form Suqiu, or the Malaysian Chinese Organization Election 
Appeals Committee. They submitted a list of seventeen demands, including 
the promotion of non-ethnic issues (i.e. democracy, human rights, justice, and 
national unity) and communal issues (i.e. modernizing New Villages, egalitarian 
multiculturalism, implementation of a meritocratic system at university). The 
demand for the government to abolish the special rights and privileges of the 
31 See Universities and University Colleges Act 1971, Universities and University Colleges (Amend-
ments) Act 1975. 
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Bumiputras in the Malaysian Constitution, especially, has been widely criticized 
and described by Malay politicians as “robbing the Malay community” of their 
rights as the indigenous people of Malaysia. 
Although Suqiu’s demands were accepted in principle by the National 
Front’s Malaysian Chinese Association and Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, 
the United Malays National Organisation condemned them as inappropriately 
communal and threatening; therefore, they were never implemented officially 
(Martinez, 2001; Weiss, 2006: 135). The controversial demands were withdrawn 
due to pressure from the United Malays National Organisation and Malay-based 
organizations. One of the justifications was to avoid repetition of the 1969 racial 
riots, as well as to preserve racial coexistence in the Malaysian society. The 
“opposition political parties and other forces have taken its prior experience of 
coalition building one step further, thus unified in a single coalition and reached 
a reasonably stable consensus on a set of immediate priorities, policy references 
and leaders” (Weiss, 2006: 241); the Alternative Front failed to form an effective 
counter alliance due to the opposition’s strong ethnic appeal and community 
dependence (Loh and Saravanamuttu, 2003).
The lack of symmetrical power to counterbalance the government’s actions 
further contributed to the arrogance of the State on not compromising with the 
requests by the movement challengers. With Mahathir passing the baton to a 
“clean and reputable” Abdullah Badawi as the new Prime Minister in 2003, the 
situation of Malaysian domestic politics and focus of policies has changed since 
then. Although Abdullah has been trying to reform the party and government, 
the government’s general bias against Chinese education seen as detrimental 
to the development of a national culture and as a hindrance to national unity 
and assimilation continues (Lee, 2000). Nevertheless, as a leader still finding his 
way and who needs electoral support from the Chinese, Abdullah is unlikely to 
implement extreme measures to remove vernacular schools. 
Since independence, Malaysia’s ruling multi-party and multi-ethnic coalition, 
the National Front, has enjoyed unchallenged preeminence with the control of both 
legislative and executive pillars of government institutions. They have won every 
parliamentary election since then. The National Front, under the lead (and domina-
tion) of the United Malays National Organisation, remains the most vital and powerful 
political alliance in Malaysia (Means, 1998: 98). Despite fractions and internal power 
struggles within the alliance, it still successfully constrains civil society and its activi-
ties using institutional and structural tools (Uhlin, 2001: 196-223; Loh, 2003). 
Although the movement has successfully set up a nationwide system of 
vernacular schools that has served to spread the use of Mandarin Chinese and 
the continuation of Chinese culture, it requires a strong coalition, better opportu-
nities, more resources, and greater will power in order to help the movement to 
achieve its objective. 
Conclusion
The movement has successfully set up a system of vernacular schools nation-
wide that has served to spread the use of Chinese language and the continuation 
of Chinese culture. The State has yet to forcefully close any Chinese schools 
due to the interdependent relationship between the State and the challengers, 
which helps the social movement to survive State repression. Both the Malay-
based and Chinese-based political parties have benefited by using Chinese 
education issues to generate haters among the Malays, and support from the 
Chinese in contained contention politics.
With its origins as an ethnically-minority movement against a majority-
dominated State, the movement that supports Chinese language education 
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has broadened its advocacy over time to include fighting for the expansion of 
civil rights, and promoting a society of tolerance and respect for diversity rather 
than one that rests on narrow-minded chauvinism. Such appeals seek a com-
mon ground that can unite opposition actors, while making reformist demands 
appear morally irrefutable and universally relevant (Weiss, 2006: 49). Nobody 
stopped the Malaysian government from using a myriad of legal (and at times 
coercive) mechanisms to contain and decertify the movement. 
On the other hand, the movement has engaged in various forms of trans-
gressive contention and engagement to sustain its activities within the illiberal 
democracy environment. The framing on the importance of mother tongue 
education, closely bound with Chinese rights, as well as the continuous threat 
by the State, has helped to sustain the movement. The growing presence of 
the People’s Republic of China, especially its influence in world politics and 
economy, has raised the economic value of Mandarin as the next most significant 
and profitable lingua-franca of the world in this century. The fact that this social 
movement has begun and survived as domestic resistance to State repression 
has been self-sufficient with the support of the Chinese community in Malay-
sia. China’s influence or intervention in this movement is almost absent. More 
practically, the movement still needs to establish strong ties and collaborative 
relationships with other activists, non-governmental organizations, and the civil 
society in Malaysia in order to generate a strong collective action that will be 
powerful enough to achieve its final goal. 
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